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CROSSING THE RUBICON: WHY THE COMCAST/TIME
WARNER CABLE MERGER SHOULD BE BLOCKED
Maurice E. Stucke* & Allen P. Grunes**
It seems fair to ask: Is this merger a done deal?
Quite a few financial analysts and some antitrust lawyers think so.
They have publicly suggested that the Department of Justice and the Federal
Communications Commission likely will approve Comcast Corp.’s
acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC), subject to a few conditions, such
as the extension of the Comcast-NBC Universal modified final judgment.
In a press call, both Comcast and TWC CEOs voiced confidence
that the transaction would receive the necessary approvals, pointing to the
absence of any break-up fee (or reverse break-up fee) as evidence of their
confidence.

Comcast has also argued that the combination would not

reduce competition because the two cable providers do not compete in local
markets. So is the only unanswered question what, if any, modifications
will there be to Comcast’s obligations under the existing NBC Universal
Final Judgment?
One thought experiment is to suppose that the predictions are
correct. Suppose the merger, while not sailing through the regulatory
process, is likely to remain relatively intact. If true, ask the following
question: If Comcast can acquire TWC, what prevents Comcast from
extending its footprint across America by acquiring all the remaining cable
companies?
*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; Of Counsel,
GeyerGorey LLP.
**
Partner, GeyerGorey LLP.
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That was our initial query. And it seems difficult to discern a
limiting principle, since the same justification for the Comcast/TWC
transaction could easily be offered for a Comcast/TWC/Charter deal. Cable
companies tend not to compete with one another for customers.
But upon closer examination, we wonder whether Comcast even
would need to acquire other cable companies after acquiring TWC, which
Comcast’s CEO described as the “premier pure play cable company in the
US.” In acquiring TWC, according to one analysis, Comcast’s services
would become available to 70 per cent of the U.S. population (up from its
current potential reach of 42 per cent of the U.S. population). After TWC,
Comcast’s remaining conquests are Nevada and even less populated
regions, like North Dakota. With due respect to those states’ citizens, why
bother? But suppose Comcast later seeks to acquire a local cable company.
After letting this merger through, can the DoJ seriously argue that
Comcast’s expansion into Iowa may somehow “substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly?” Hardly. Thus this deal with
TWC is critical. Comcast is crossing the regulatory Rubicon.
As noted, Comcast principally argues that it does not compete with
TWC in the same geographic markets. Without any competitive overlap,
according to Comcast, the acquisition does not really change anything. But
this is wrong for several reasons.
First, a merger can violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act without the
parties competing in the same geographic market. Suppose each state had
its own cable monopoly. Comcast, under its logic, could legally acquire
every cable company in the US.

Even if New York consumers were

unaffected when Comcast acquires other Midwest cable monopolies,
Comcast’s acquisition of local monopolies affects the overall competitive
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landscape. Moreover, if Comcast’s rivals compete throughout the US, and
if Comcast can disadvantage its rivals by raising their costs, then consumers
can be adversely affected far beyond Comcast’s local cable monopolies.
The intent under Section 7, as in other parts of the Clayton Act, is as
courts recognised to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency –
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act
proceeding. Congress sought to prevent situations where “several large
enterprises [were] extending their power by successive small acquisitions”.
Here Comcast is extending its power through a significant acquisition – one
that expands its reach to most of the US population.
As the DoJ found, Comcast and TWC already have market power
for both video and broadband services in numerous local geographic
markets. Comcast is the nation’s largest provider of video services (22
million residential customers at the end of 2012), internet services (19.4
million customers), and voice services (10 million customers). At the end of
2012, 41 per cent of the homes and businesses in the geographic areas
Comcast served subscribed to Comcast’s video services; 36 per cent of the
homes and businesses subscribed to Comcast’s internet services. As the
largest video content distributor in many areas of the country, Comcast
controls the pipes. But it also creates content through its national cable
networks (including CNBC, MSNBC, and USA Network), regional sports
networks, broadcast television (including NBC and Telemundo broadcast
networks) and movie studio Universal Pictures, which produces, acquires,
markets and distributes filmed entertainment worldwide.
In acquiring TWC, the second largest cable provider of video, highspeed data and voice services in the US, Comcast extends its market power
in five geographic areas: New York State (including New York City), the
Carolinas, the Midwest (including Ohio, Kentucky and Wisconsin),
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Southern California (including Los Angeles), and Texas. This aggregation
of important local markets, we submit, has antitrust significance.
Second, the Congressional command for Section 7 is to “preserve
competition among many small businesses by arresting a trend toward
concentration in its incipiency before the trend developed to the point that a
market was left in the grip of a few big companies,” as the Supreme Court
said in Von’s Grocery. It was fashionable before the economic crisis for
antitrust technocrats to scoff at Von’s, and at considering any trend toward
concentration and the incipiency standard in merger review. But after the
havoc caused by financial institutions too big to fail (or to criminally
prosecute), the incipiency standard has reappeared in the DoJ and FTC’s
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. One potential consequence of this merger is
to accelerate the trend toward concentration among content providers and
cable companies.

Indeed, the chairman of DISH Network reportedly

commented that this deal, if approved, “certainly doesn’t hurt the case for
consolidation” of satellite TV providers, notwithstanding the fact that the
US blocked a deal between Dish and DirecTV in 2002.
Third, one reason Congress sought to thwart a market dominated by
a few firms is to prevent coordination or collusion. With fewer competitors,
coordination, either express or tacit, becomes easier. We are already beyond
that point. The DoJ and New York recently charged Comcast, TWC, Cox,
and Bright House Networks of agreeing to restrain competition with
Verizon. Basically the cable companies sought to extend their “triple play”
of voice, video, and broadband services into a “quad play” that included
Verizon’s wireless services. Verizon, however, offered its competing “triple
play” of voice, video, and broadband FiOS services. Under their agreement,
in regions where Verizon’s FiOS competed with the defendant cable
companies, Verizon would have sold two “quad play” products--its own and
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its competitors. Verizon further agreed not to offer consumers a better price
for its own quad play product. Not surprisingly the competitors’ agreement,
the DoJ alleged, would have diminished Verizon’s incentives and ability to
compete against Comcast, TWC, and the other cable providers. Why did
Verizon hamstring itself? The cable companies agreed not to partner with a
competing wireless company. And Verizon received a commission from
selling its competitors’ products. This recent enforcement action shows how
highly concentrated markets are susceptible to coordination.
Fourth, Comcast’s “no-competitive-overlap” argument considers
only cable and internet subscribers. It ignores how the competition laws
were also enacted to protect sellers from powerful buyers. One concern that
arose in the recent joint hearings between the DoJ and Department of
Agriculture is anticompetitive buyer power, namely monopsony. The
complaint was that tepid antitrust enforcement over the past 30 years has
left farmers and ranchers at the whim of powerful buyers. The emerging
academic scholarship suggests that monopsony power can occur at lower
market shares than monopoly power. Thus another concern is how the
acquisition increases Comcast’s power to disadvantage sellers of television
content (and raise the costs of Comcast’s rivals).
Fifth, in investigating Comcast’s deal with General Electric that
ultimately enabled Comcast to control NBC Universal, the DoJ discussed
various ways Comcast could disadvantage its traditional competitors (direct
broadcast satellite and telephone companies) plus the emerging online video
programming distributors (OVDs). Netflix and other OVDs rely on internet
service providers like Comcast and TWC to deliver their television shows
and movies to subscribers. Thus the growth of OVDs, as the DoJ found,
“depends, in part, on how quickly [internet service providers] expand and
upgrade their broadband facilities and the preservation of their incentives to
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innovate and invest.” In acquiring TWC, Comcast will have even more
power to thwart Netflix or other emerging OVD rivals by impairing or
delaying the delivery of their content. (Although Netflix recently sought to
contractually resolve this issue with Comcast, other OVDs may lack the
clout.)
Comcast might respond that whatever these concerns’ validity, its
current Final Judgments with the DoJ ameliorate them. Comcast will likely
extend net neutrality to TWC subscribers, promise to increase its broadband
speed, and expand in rural and low-income areas. Comcast has also
expressed a willingness to divest certain systems serving approximately 3
million managed cable subscribers, to be below 30 per cent of nationwide
multichannel video subscribers. Why is that not good enough?
The FCC’s 30-percent limit on nationwide multichannel video
subscribers that any single cable provider can serve was vacated in 2009 by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit; in its recent 10-K, TWC “is
unable to predict when the FCC will take action to set new limits, if any.”
So that is hardly a barrier. At what point does the DoJ become concerned
and wonder whether its NBCU Final Judgment will protect suppliers and
consumers? The judgment, for example, requires Comcast to maintain its
internet access speed above a certain level. But the DoJ cannot know what a
competitive market could bring.

That is a fatal flaw of behavioural

remedies. Comcast continues to deliver expensive and (according to some
critics) inferior broadband. In the US, it lags Google Fibre and other
internet service providers. And there is less incentive for Comcast, after
acquiring TWC, to innovate and compete.
AT&T, like Comcast, described its proposed acquisition of TMobile as somehow pro-consumer, pro-innovation, and pro-investment.
AT&T apocryphally predicted that if its merger in a highly concentrated
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industry were blocked, consumers would suffer from lower output, worse
quality, and higher prices. But AT&T and T-Mobile abandoned their
merger after the DoJ’s challenge, and consumers now benefit from the
competition by T-Mobile. Generally, antitrust views competition, not its
reduction, as the remedy for allocating scarce resources. This deal is by no
means done.
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